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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Has the Appellant satisfied its obligation on appeal to marshal the
evidence in support of the Order of the Utah Labor Commission and show that, despite
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom that the
Findings are not supported by substantial evidence?
Standard of Review: The appropriate standard of review for a formal adjudicative
hearing is found in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, §6346b-16(4)(g) (1988) which provides that:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced
by any of the following:
# * #

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court;
The Appellant is challenging the factual findings of the Utah Labor Commission stating
that thosefindingsare not supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court will
not overturn thefindingsof the Labor Commission unless they are "arbitrary and
capricious," "wholly without cause", or without substantial evidence to support them.
Kerans v. Industrial Commission. 713 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1986). Agency factual findings
will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion is
permissible. Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
4

Issue 2: Did the Labor Commission properly determine that Pinnacle Homes was
an "employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-103 (2), allowing
Pinnacle Homes to be found to be the statutory employer of Mr. Ebmeyer under Utah
Code Annotated §34A-2-103(7)?
Standard of Review: Generally, "matters of statutory construction are questions
of law that are reviewed for correctness." Esquivel v. Labor Commission, 7 P.3d 777
(Utah 2000). The determination of this issue is not confined to only statutory
interpretation, but also involves the application of the terms of Utah Code Annotated
§34A-2-103 to the particular facts of this case.
The Utah Labor Commission has been granted broad discretion by the Legislature
to determine the facts and apply the law. Section 34A-1-301(1997) of the Utah Code
expressly provides that "[t]he commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction,
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or
chapter it administers." When the governing statute makes an explicit grant of discretion
to [an agency, the appellate court] appl[ies] a reasonableness and rationality standard, and
may only overturn the [agency's] conclusions of law if they are unreasonable and
irrational." Bernard v. Motor Vehicle Division, 905 P.2d317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In workers compensation cases such as the instant matter, involving mixed
questions of law and fact, the findings and conclusions of the Labor Commission are
entitled to great deference. The determination of the Labor Commission must be upheld
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"unless the determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to
constitute an abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA." Ae
Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 996 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 2000),
cert den. 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah, 2000). Therefore, the Court will not overturn the findings
of a workers compensation case, "unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly
without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the
evidence." McKesson Corp. v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 468, 473 (Utah Ct. App.
2002) quotingfromLarge v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Preservation for Appeal: Respondent acknowledges that the issue of whether
Pinnacle Homes was his statutory employer was raised by Petitioner before the Utah
Labor Commission. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated §§34A-2-103 (2001) and 34A-2-104 (2001) are the
applicable statutes. The "statutory employer" provision is found in Section 103 (7)(a)
which states:
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part
for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are
considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
6

Section 104 (4) allows corporate directors to opt out of workers compensation
coverage and provides:
(a) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the corporation
as an employee under this chapter and Chapter 3.
(b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection (4) (a), the corporation
shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be
excluded from coverage.
(c) A director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this
chapter and Chapter 3 until the notice described in Subsection (4) (b) is given.
The statutes are set forth in full in the Addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Ebmeyer was employed by Platinum Builders as a shingler on new

home construction beginning January of 2003. (AR 227: P20, L16 through P21, L20).
2.

Mr. Ebmeyer received his work from Mel Beagley of Platinum Builders.

(AR 227: P28, L22 through P29, L10).
3.

After Mr. Ebmeyer received the call to appear for work, Mr. Ebmeyer

usually arrived at the worksite and the worksite was already stocked and ready for work.
(AR227:P29,L13-L24.)
4.

Mr. Ebmeyer did not work for anyone other than Platinum Builders during

the relevant time period from January of 2003 to the date of injury in August of 2003.
(AR 227: P31, L2 through P32, L3.)
5.

Mr. Ebmeyer testified that no one from Pinnacle Homes came to the
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Saratoga Springs house he was working on while he was there. (AR 227: P36, L20
through P37,L8.)
6.

Mr. Ebmeyer worked on four (4) houses for Pinnacle Homes - possibly six

(6) total. (AR 227: P42, L24 through P43, L3.)
7.

Mr. Ebmeyer testified he did not know if Pinnacle ever inspected his work

or not. (AR 227: P58, L20-L25.)
8.

After his injury, Mr. Ebmeyer dealt with Mel Beagley of Platinum Builders

with respect to reporting the injury and obtaining his last paycheck. (AR 227: P45, L9
through P465L2.)
9.

Mr. Ebmeyer received no checks from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P54, L5-

10.

Mr. Bbmeyer received no materials from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P54,

L9.

L10-L13.
11.

Mr. Ebmeyer received no tools or other supplies from Pinnacle Homes.

(AR227:P54,L14-L17.)
12.

Mr. Ebmeyer received no training from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P57,

L12-L20.)
13.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Platinum Builders, a

general contractor, had been hired to put roofs on the houses that Pinnacle owned. (AR
227:P76,L13-L23.)
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14.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that upon inquiry Mel

Beagley of Platinum Builders advised that Beagley had opted out of workers
compensation coverage. (AR 227: P79, L7 - L14.)
15.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle was not aware

that anyone other than Mel Beagley and Platinum Builders was doing the roofs on the
houses owned by Pinnacle. (AR 227: P80, L8 - L12.)
16.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Mr. Beagley and

Platinum Builders were not paid by the hour, but were paid on a lump sum contract. (AR
227:P80,L13-L18.)
17.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle is in the

business of selling new homes to clients who contract with Pinnacle to provide them a
house. Pinnacle "will buy the land and spec a home on it." (AR 227: P87, L2 - L22.)
18.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle subdivided its

operations among subcontractors, contracting with Platinum Builders to do a portion and
doing the same with the framing, plumbing, and so on. There was no general contractor
who oversaw each aspect of the building of the house.(AR 227: P85, L5 - L13.)
19.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that when the corporation is

subcontracting all of the work on a house, it decides if the subcontractors should be paid.
And the corporation goes out and inspects to make sure the work is completed. (AR 227:
P92,L10-L19.)
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20.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle does not pay

an invoice for work unless the work is done. (AR 227: P98, L24 - L25.)
21.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that if it received a

complaint from a homeowner that the roof on one of their houses leaked, it would be the
responsibility of the contractor to make the repair. (AR 227: P93, L9 - L16.)
22.

Mr. Ebmeyer testified that while working on a different house for Pinnacle

Homes prior to his accident he was approached by someone in a Pinnacle truck and asked
when Mel was going to fix the leaking roof across the street. (AR 227: P40, L6 - L20.)
23.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle did not direct

or control Mel Beagley or Platinum Builders regarding how the work was done and left
the inspections of the houses to the cities. (AR 227: P98, L14 through P99, L4.)
24.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle does not have

any employees and does not do any of the physical work on the houses it owns. (AR 227:
P95,L23 through P96,L6.)
25.

Pinnacle Homes filed its application with the insurance agent notifying her

that it did not have any employees and told the insurance agent that Pinnacle wanted to
opt out of workers compensation coverage. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, L21.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Labor Commission properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-103(2), because an
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employer is defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers or
operatives in the same business". Although Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-104(4) allows
the corporate officers and directors of Pinnacle Homes to opt out of workers
compensation coverage, the Labor Commission appropriately found that Pinnacle failed
to provide the required written notice to its workers compensation carrier. Even if
Pinnacle had successfully opted out of the coverage requirement pursuant to §104(4),
Pinnacle's argument that it would not be an "employer" under the "statutory employer"
provision of §103(7) (a) is incorrect.
The Labor Commission Order granting Mr. Ebmeyer benefits from the employer,
Platinum Builders and the statutory employer, Pinnacle Homes was reasonable and
rational.
ARGUMENTS
I.

PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE LABOR COMMISSION ORDER AND THUS
HAS FAILED IN ITS DUTY ON APPEAL
If Pinnacle Homes wants to challenge the Order of the Labor Commission, it is

required to marshal all of the evidence supporting the agency's findings and show that
despite supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. Hales
Sand and Granite, Inc. V. Audit Division, 842 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah 1992). Pinnacle
Homes has totally failed to do so.
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It is well established that a party challenging a finding of fact of a lower Court or
an administrative agency has the burden of establishing that those findings are not
supported by the evidence and thus, are clearly erroneous. See , Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a);
Cambelt International Corp. V. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). In order to
successfully challenge a finding of fact of a trial court or administrative agency on appeal,
a petitioner/appellant must list all evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate that
the evidence is inadequate to sustain the findings, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the court or agency below. See , Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah
1998).
The Courts of Utah have stated that the marshaling process is like being the devil's
advocate. A petitioner/appellant may not merely present selected evidence favorable to
his or her position without presenting any of the evidence supporting the findings of the
lower court or agency. See, Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings appellant resists.
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inventory Co., 812P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamentally different from
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that of presenting of presenting the claim at the hearing. As explained by the Utah
Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart. 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004):
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the
record in support of their position [citing cases]. Nor can they simply restate or
review evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial
court's finding of fact [citing cases]. Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the
burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the
trial court's findings. Id. at 1195.
The Court went on to emphasize that: "If the marshaling requirement is not met,
the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone "and "we
assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings." Id.at 1196. See also.
Merriam v. Industrial Commission. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Featherstone
v. Industrial Commission. 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Pinnacle Homes has not even attempted to marshal the evidence in favor of the
Order of the Labor Commission. Rather, they have merely recited facts favorable to their
position, while making the conclusional statement that there is no substantial evidence to
support the findings of the Labor Commission. When a petitioner/appellant fails or
refuses to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, appellate courts are bound
to assume the record supports the factual findings of the lower court or administrative
agency. In fact, appellate courts have shown no reluctance to affirm when the
petitioner/appellant fails to meet its marshaling burden. See. Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d
9,12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
As a result of the failure of Pinnacle Homes to marshal the evidence in this matter
13

its Petition for Review should be dismissed. To rule otherwise would allow any party on
appeal to supplant findings of the lower court or administrative agency with that parties'
own purported findings without marshaling evidence or satisfying the substantial
evidence test.
II.

THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
PINNACLE HOMES WAS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED §34A-2-104 (4),
Pinnacle Homes argues that the Labor Commission erred when it found that

Pinnacle was an "employer" under §34A-2-104 (4). This section of the Utah Workers
Compensation Act allows corporate officers and directors to opt out of the required
workers compensation coverage, provided they " . . . serve written notice upon its
insurance carrier naming the persons to be excluded from coverage." A representative
from Pinnacle testified Pinnacle Homes filed its application with the insurance agent
notifying her that it did not have any employees and told the insurance agent that Pinnacle
wanted to opt out of workers compensation coverage. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97,
L21.) The Labor Commission relied upon the opinion in Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment
Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998) as guidance for concluding that"... corporations must
strictly comply with §104(4)(b)'s requirements for exclusion of officers and directors
from coverage." See, Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 217-222, Page 3. Based on
the foregoing, the Labor Commission appropriately found that Pinnacle did not provide
the required written notice to its workers compensation insurance carrier, and that the
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officers and directors of Pinnacle remained employee of the corporation, and as such
Pinnacle was an employer subject to the "statutory employer" provision of §34A-1103(7). Id. at Pages 3-4.
Even if Pinnacle had successfully opted out of the coverage requirement of
§104(4), Pinnacle's argument that because it had no employees, it was not an "employer"
under the "statutory employer" provision of §103 (7) (a) is flawed. Pinnacle assumes
that compliance with §104(4)'s opting out provision eliminates Pinnacle's status as an
"employer". However, Pinnacle's reading of that provision is too expansive, in that
§104(4) does not state that a corporation that exempts officers and directors from
coverage is not an "employer" per §103(7)(a). Rather, the language of that provision is
specifically limited to the issue of workers compensation insurance coverage for
corporate officers and directors. It is presumed that the Legislature allowed such opting
out of directors and officers to allow high paid executives to pursue more generous
benefits than offered by workers compensation and its statutory maximum.
Pinnacle Homes takes the erroneous position that Section 34A-2-104(4) defines
whether a person or entity is an "employer" for workers compensation purposes.
Petitioner's Brief at 18. However, that definition is found in Section 34A-2-103(2) of the
Act which defines "employer " as " . . . each person . . . who regularly employs one or
more workers or operatives in the same business,... under any contract of hire [.]"
Section 103(2)(b) indicates: " 'Regularly ' includes all employments in the usual course
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of the . . . business . . . of the employer " [.]

According to the Webster's Third New

International Dictionary ,Page 1686, (1986) a "person " is defined as: "a human being, a
body of persons, or a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity that is recognized by
law as the subject of rights and duties."
If, arguendo, the officers and directors of Pinnacle Homes opt out of workers
compensation coverage, Pinnacle is nonetheless still an "employer " as set forth in
§103(2) because it is still a corporation/person which "regularly" employs ".. .one or
more operatives in the same business... "In other words, Pinnacle Homes as a
corporation does not cease to exist just because its officers and directors may decide to
opt out of workers compensation coverage. The officers and directors of Pinnacle
Homes, who are also workers or operatives, legally continue to pursue the business of
Pinnacle, which is buying the land and building new spec homes for clients. (AR 227:
P87, L2 -L22.) Pinnacle regularly employs one or more operatives or subcontractors to
build all aspects of its houses, in the usual course of its business. (AR 227: P85, L5- L13.)
Therefore, a conclusion that Pinnacle is an "employer " as defined in §103(2) is not only
reasonable but inevitable; and since Pinnacle is an "employer " it can also be a "statutory
employer ".
A.

PINNACLE HOMES WAS ALSO THE EMPLOYER OF MR.
EBMEYER UNDER THE TRADITIONAL "RIGHT TO
CONTROL " TEST.

The Administrative Law Judge also found that Mr. Ebmeyer was a statutory
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employee of Pinnacle Homes. The "statutory employer" provision of the Act is found in
Section 103 (7)(a) which states:
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part
for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are
considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
The leading Utah case applying the concept of "statutory employer " is Bennett v.
Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). In Bennett the Supreme Court
observed:
According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to protect
employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within his
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and insist upon
appropriate compensation protection for their workers."(tite omitted) A secondary
purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of [workers compensation acts]
by those who might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations among
subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations with the workers.. .Id.
at 431. (cite omitted).
The Court ruled t h a t " . . . a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of
the general contractor if (1) the general contractor retains some supervision or control
over the subcontractor's work, and (2) the work done by the subcontractor is a 'part or
process in the trade or business of the employers.'" Id. at 431 (citations omitted). In
addition, the Court went on to find that "[a] subcontractor's work is 'part or process in the
trade or business of the employer ' if it is part of the operations which directly relate to
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the successful performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise." See
Bennett, 726 P.2d at 431. The Court also addressed the requirement that the general
contractor as a "statutory employer " retain "supervision and control" of the
subcontractor's work by stating:
In dealing with "statutory " employees, the statute begins with the proposition that
the claimant qualifies as an employee of the subcontractor. But the statutory
requirement that the general contractor have "supervision or control" over the
work of the subcontractor cannot mean that the subcontractor must also qualify as
an employee of the general contractor. That would be at least highly improbable
and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather, the term "supervision or control"
requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control over the project. Id.
at 431-432 (cite omitted).
* * *

Although the construction process requires the general contractor to delegate to a
greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor remains
responsible for successful completion of the entire project and of necessity retains
the right to require that subcontractors perform according to specifications. The
power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of subcontractors satisfies
the requirement that the general contractor retain supervision or control over the
subcontractor, (cite omitted) Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work is a part
or process of the general contractor's business, an inference arises that the general
contractor has retained supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to
meet the requirement of §[34A-2-103(7)(a)]. Id. at 432 (cite omitted).
In the case at bar, Mr. Ebmeyer was hired by Mel Beagley of Platinum Builders as
a shingler. (AR 227: P20, L16 through P21, L20). Mr. Beagley held a general contractor's
license but his main business was roofing. (AR 227: P78, L16 through P79, LI).
Pinnacle Homes builds and sells new "spec" homes. (AR227: P87,L2-L22). It
subcontracts out all phases of the new home construction. (AR 227: P85, L5 - LI 3).
18

Towards this end, Pinnacle let a subcontract to Platinum to install roofs on its houses in
the Saratoga Springs housing development. (AR 227: P76, L13 - L23). In effect,
Pinnacle is the "general contractor" on its jobs, because they have elected not to hire a
licensed general contractor to oversee all aspects of the construction of their homes. (AR
227: P85, L5 - L13). The roofing work performed by Platinum Builders is absolutely
necessary for the successful completion of the commercial enterprise of Pinnacle Homes,
because Pinnacle cannot sell a new house without a roof. Therefore, clearly roofing is a
"part or process in the trade or business of the employer, " which as it pertains to Pinnacle
is the building and selling of new houses.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Pinnacle Homes decided which
subcontractors to hire to build its houses. An officer of Pinnacle testified that it decided
which subcontractors would get paid, and that they would inspect the work for
completion. (AR 227: P92, L10 - L19). If Pinnacle Homes received a complaint from
one of their customers about a leaking roof, the roofing contractor would be responsible
for the repair. (AR 227: P93, L9- LI6). So, while Pinnacle may have delegated the
roofing of the house to Platinum, Pinnacle remained ultimately responsible for the
successful completion of the house for their customer. By necessity, Pinnacle has and
had the right to require that its subcontractors perform according to its contractual
specifications. Therefore, "[t]he power to supervise or control the ultimate performance
of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain supervision

19

or control over the subcontractor." See Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432.
The Court in Bennett concluded by noting:
.. .that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act supports the
conclusion that §[34A-2-103(7)(a)] should be construed in favor of protecting the
employee, (citations omitted) The Arizona Supreme Court in construing an
almost identical statutory provision, has stated that it "is a legislatively created
scheme by which conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought within the
coverage of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act." Id. at 432 (cite omitted).
In light of the foregoing public policy statement, it cannot be fairly said that the
Legislature intended to create a "safe harbor "for the comparmentalization of businesses.
To find otherwise, would be inconsistent with the overarching concern of preventing
evasion of the Workers Compensation Act expressed in the Section 34a-2-103.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ebmeyer's injuries were suffered in the course and scope of his employment
with Platinum Builders. On the date of his injury he was engaged in activities that were
"a part or process in the .. .business of" Pinnacle Homes, making it reasonable and
rational for the Labor Commission to find that Pinnacle was the "statutory employer " of
Mr. Ebmeyer. The Order of the Utah Labor Commission below, should be affirmed.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2007.

Timothy C. Ajkn
CounsShf6flGlen M. Ebmeyer

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the 13th day of March, 2007 a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT GLEN M. EBMEYER was hand-delivered and/or mailed, as follows:
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
P.O. 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0230

(1) original and (7) copies

Theodore E. Kanell
Joseph C. Alamilla
Plant Christensen & Kanell
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(2 copies)

David J. Holdsworth
9125 S. Monroe Plaza Way, Ste. C
Sandy, UT 84070

(1 copy)

Alan Hennebold
Utah Labor Commission
P.O. 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600

(1 copy)

/

Timothy C. Allen
Counsel for Glen M. Ebmeyer

21

ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated, §34A-2-103 (2001)
Utah Code Annotated, §34A-2-104 (2001)
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WOKKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

_ . J . S . — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1.
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 616.
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained while attending
employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the
course of employment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566.
Employer's liability for injury caused by food or drink
purchased by employee in plant facilities, 50 A.L.R.3d 505.
Workers' compensation law as precluding employee's suit
against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49
A.L.R.4th 926.
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as compensable, 52
A.L.R.4th 731.
Workers' compensation: injuries incurred during labor activity, 61 A.L.R.4th 196.
Workers' compensation: injuries incurred while traveling to
or from work with employer's receipts, 63 A.L.R.4th 253.
Workers' compensation: coverage of employee's injury or
death from exposure to the elements — modern cases, 20
A.L.R.5th 346.
Workers'compensation: Lyme disease, 22 A.L.R.5th 246.
Employer's liability to employee or agent for injury or death
resulting from assault or criminal attack by third person, 40
A.L.R.5th 1.
Presumption or inference t h a t accidental death of employee
engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose
out of and in course of employment, 47 A.L.R.5th 801.
34A-2-103. E m p l o y e r s e n u m e r a t e d a n d defined —
Regularly employed — Statutory employers.
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school
district in the state are considered employers under this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) For the purposes of t h e exclusive remedy in this
chapter and Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act
prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state
is considered to be a single employer and includes any
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board,
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person,
including each public utility and each independent contractor,
who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in
the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
is considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act. As used in this Subsection (2):
(a) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of any work for another who,
while so engaged, is:
(i) independent of the employer in all that pertains
to the execution of the work;
(ii) not subject to the routine rule or control of the
. employer;
(iii) engaged only in the performance of a definite
job or piece of work; and
(iv) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a
result in accordance with the employer's design.
(b) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of
the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or
for only a portion of the year.
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Professional Employer
Organization Licensing Act, is considered the employer of
leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation
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benefits for them by complying with Subsection 34A-2201(1) or (2) and commission rules.
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite workers' compensation secured in accordance with Subsection (3)(a)
showing t h e leasing company as the named insured and
each client company as an additional insured by means of
individual endorsements.
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as
directed by commission rule.
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of
Occupation and Professional Licensing within the Department of Commerce if the division has reason to believe
t h a t an employee leasing company is not in compliance
v/ith Subsection 34A-2-20K1) or (2) and commission rules.
(4) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee
or more t h a n one employee at least 40 hours per week is not
considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(5) (a) As used in this Subsection (5):
(i) (A) "agricultural employer" means a person
who employs agricultural labor as defined in
Subsections 35A-4-206(l) and (2) and does not
include employment as provided in Subsection
35A-4-206(3); and
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a)(i)(A),
only for purposes of determining who is a member of the employer's immediate family under
Subsection (5)(a)(ii), if the agricultural employer
is a corporation, partnership, or other business
entity, "agricultural employer" means an officer,
director, or partner of the business entity;
(ii) "employer's immediate family" means:
(A) a n agricultural employer's*.
(I) spouse;
(II) grandparent;
(III) parent;
(IV) sibling;
(V) child;
(VI) grandchild;
(VII) nephew; or
(VIII) niece;
(B) a spouse of any person provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii)(A)(II) through (VIII); or
(C) an individual who is similar to those listed
in Subsections (5)(a)(ii)(A) or (B) as defined by
rules of the commission; and
(iii) "non-immediate family" means a person who is
not a member of t h e employer's immediate family.
(b) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, U t a h
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not
considered an employer of a member of the employer's
immediate family.
(c) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, U t a h
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not
considered an employer of a non-immediate family employee if:
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural
employer's total annual payroll for all non-immediate
family employees was less t h a n $8,000; or
(ii) (A) for t h e previous calendar year the agricultural employer's total annual payroll for all nonimmediate family employees was equal to or
greater t h a n $8,000 but less than $50,000; and
(B) the agricultural employer maintains insurance t h a t covers job-related injuries of the
employer's non-immediate family employees in
at least the following amounts:
(I) $300,000 liability insurance, as defined in Section 31A-1-301; and
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(II) $5,000 for health care benefits similar
to benefits under health care insurance as
defined in Section 31A-1-301.
(d) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is
considered an employer of a non-immediate family employee if:
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural
employer's total annual payroll for all non-immediate
family employees is equal to or greater than $50,000;
or
(ii) (A) for the previous year the agricultural employer's total payroll for non-immediate family
employees was equal to or exceeds $8,000 but is
less than $50,000; and
(B) the agricultural employer fails to maintain
the insurance required under Subsection
(5)(c)(ii).
(6) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not considered an employer under this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, may come
under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act, by complying with:
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act; and
(b) the rules of the commission.
(7) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for the employer by a
contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all
persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractors, are considered employees of the
original employer for the purposes of this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence that the person
owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's
personal residence may not be considered an employee or
employer solely by operation of Subsection (7)(a).
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole
proprietorship may not be considered an employee under
Subsection (7)(a) if the employer who procures work to be
done by the partnership or sole proprietorship obtains
and relies on either:
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole
proprietorship's compliance with Section 34A-2-201
indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship
secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no
employees other than a partner of the partnership or
owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21-104(8) stating that:
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business;
and
(B) the partner or owner personally waives
the partner's or owner's entitlement to the benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, in the operation of the
partnership or sole proprietorship.
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be
considered an employee under Subsection (7)(a) if the
director or officer is excluded .from coverage under Subsection 34A-2-104(4).
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(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer under Subsection (7)(a), if the employer who
procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on either:
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201; or
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship with no employees other than a partner of the
partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the
sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy
issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21104(8) stating that:
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business; and
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner
personally waives the partner's, corporate officer's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, in the operation of the partnership's,
corporation's, or sole proprietorship's enterprise
under a contract of hire for services.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917, § 3110; L. 1919,
ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-40; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,
42-1-40; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983, ch. 355,
§ 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 3; 1988, ch. 109, § 1; 1992, ch. 178, § 2;
1993, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 140, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 77; 1995,
ch. 307, § 1; 1996, ch. 190, § 2; C. 1953, 35-1-42; renumbered
by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 107; 1997, ch. 201, § 1; renumbered by
L. 1997, ch. 375, § 85; 1998, ch. 277, § 2; 1999, ch. 55, §§ 2,3;
1999, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; 2001, ch. 116, § 192.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment by ch. 106,
effective May 3, 1993, in Subsection (1), added the (a) designation and added Subsection (1Kb).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1995,
substituted "35-2-102" for "35-2-3" in Subsection (l)(b).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 307, effective May 1, 1995,
deleted a reference to Section 35-2-3 in Subsection (l)(b);
added "for the purposes of Chapters 1 and.2" in Subsection
(6)(a); deleted Subsections (6)(b) and (c), discussing general
contractors and subcontractors, and redesignated Subsection
(6)(d) as (b) and (6)(e) as (c); rewrote Subsections (6XcXi) and
(ii), which formerly discussed employee status under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); deleted Subsection (6Xf), establishing a
presumption that partners and sole proprietors "had or shared
control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise
provide adequate payment of direct compensation," and redesignated Subsection (6)(g) as (d), substituting "35-1-43(4)" for
"35-l-43(3)(b)"; added a new Subsection (6)(e); and made
numerous related and stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 190, effective April 29, 1996,
inserted "routine" in Subsection (2)(b) and rewrote Subsection
(6).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 240, effective July 1, 1997,
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 35-142, and substituted "chapter" for "title" throughout, "Section
35A-3-105" for "Sections 35-1-60 and 35-2-102" in Subsection
(1Kb), "35A-3-201" for "35-1-46" in Subsections (3Xa), (6)(cXi)
and (ii), and (6)(e), "department" for "commission" in Subsections (3)(a), (3)(c), and (5), "this chapter and Chapter 3a" for
"Chapters 1 and 2" in Subsection (6)(a), and "35A-3-104(4)" for
"35-1-43(4)" in Subsection (6)(d).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 201, effective July 1, 1997,
added Subsection (3)(d) (see Coordination Clause below).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997,
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 35A3-103; inserted references to "Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
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ence with work is unnecessary, since it is the right to interfere
that determines relationship. Ludlow v. Industrial Comm'n,
65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925).
Another or additional test approved by Supreme Court is
that one is an independent contractor when he can employ
others to do the work and accomphsh the contemplated result
without the consent of the contractee. Gogoff v. Industrial
Comm'n, 77 Utah 355, 296 P. 229 (1931).
Test whether employer retains supervision over work of
contractor so as to make contractor and his employees under
this section employees of employer is whether employer has
right of supervision whether he exercises such right or not.
Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d
183(1935).
While it is true that manner and basis of payment of
compensation is one element to be considered in determining
whether claimant is employee or independent contractor, it is
by no means conclusive. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 99 Utah 423,107 P.2d 1027, 134 A.L.R. 1006 (1940).
Whether a workman is an "employee" or an "independent
contractor" is dependent on (1) whether the employer has the
right to control his execution of the work, (2) whether the work
done or to be done is a part or process in the trade or business
of the employer, and (3) whether the work done or to be done
is a definite job or piece of work. Parkinson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 110 Utah 309,172 P.2d 136 (1946); Ewer v. Industrial
Comm'n, 112 Utah 538, 189 P.2d 959 (1948).
The most important of the determinatives of the relationship between workman and employer is that of control. The
existence of a potential right to control is sufficient to create
the relationship even though that right is never exercised.
Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136
(1946).
Extent of control is the important test in determining status
of one as "employee" or "independent contractor," under this
section. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196
P.2d 502 (1948).
"Independent calling" or "own business" test is not followed
in Utah. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196
R2d 502 (1948).
Crucial factor in determining whether applicant for workmen's compensation is "employee" or "independent contractor"
is whether person for whom services were performed had right
to control execution of work. Sommerville v. Industrial
Comm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948).
In determining who is the employer of an employee, the
right to control the employee's work is dispositive of the
question; the degree of control actually exercised need not be
great, so long as the right exists. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
R2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
Cited in RDG Associates/Jorman Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948 (Utah 1987); Riddle v. Mays, 780 P.2d
1252 (Utah 1989); Gordon v. CRS Consulting EngYs, Inc., 820
P.2d 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
32 F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments in Utah Law
— Statutory Enactments — Labor Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
374.
Recent Legislative Developments in Utah Law: Workers'
Compensation Coverage Amendments, 1996 Utah L. Rev.
1350.
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 37 to 58.
A.L.R. — Right to maintain direct action against fellow
employee for injury or death covered by workmen's compensation, 21 A.L.R.3d 845.
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Employer's liability for negligence of employee in driving his
or her own automobile, 27 A.L.R.5th 174.
34A-2-104. '^Employee,* "worker," and "operative" defined — Mining lessees and sublessees — Cor*
porate officers and directors — Real estate
agents and brokers — Prison inmates — Insurance agents — Certain domestic workers.
(1) As used in this chapter arid Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, "employee," "worker," and "operative"
mean:
(a) (i) each elective and appointive officer and any
other person:
(A) in the service of:
(I) the state;
(II) a county, city, or town within the
state; or
(III) a school district within the state;
(B) serving the state, or any county, city, town,
or school district under:
(I) an election;
(II) appointment; or
(III) any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral; and
(ii) including:
(A) an officer or employee of the state institutions of learning; and
(B) a member of the National Guard while on
state active duty; and;
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as
defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one or more
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or
in or about the same establishment:
(i) under any contract of hire:
(A) express or implied; and
(B) oral or written;
(ii) including aliens and minors, whether legally or
illegally working for hire; and
(iii) not including any person whose employment:
(A) is casual; and
(B) not in the usual course of the trade, business, or occupation of the employee's employer.
(2) (a) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer
under this chapter and Chapter 3, any lessee in mines or
of mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be:
(i) covered for compensation by the lessor under
this chapter and Chapter 3;
(ii) subject to this chapter and Chapter 3; and
(iii) entitled to the benefits of this chapter and
Chapter 3, to the same extent as if the lessee,
employee, or sublessee were employees of the lessor
drawing the wages paid employees for substantially
similar work,
(b) The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance
premium for that type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to
include any partner of the partnership or owner of the sole
proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3.
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an
election under Subsection (3)(a), the partnership or sole
proprietorship shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be covered.
(c) A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole
proprietorship may not be considered an employee of the
partner's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship
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£* under this chapter or Chapter 3 until the notice described
\ in Subsection (3)(b) is given.
(d) For premium rate making, the insurance carrier
shall assume the salary or wage of the partner or sole
r
proprietor electing coverage under Subsection (3Xa) to be
to 100% of the state's average weekly wage.
(4) (a) A corporation may elect not to include any director
& or officer of the corporation as an employee under this
* chapter and Chapter 3.
>* (b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection
(4)(a), the corporation shall serve written notice upon its
insurance carrier naming the persons to be excluded from
coverage.
(c) A director or officer of a corporation is considered an
employee under this chapter and Chapter 3 until the
notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given.
(5) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, "employee,"
"worker," and "operative" do not include:
(a) a real estate sales agent or real estate broker, as
defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that
capacity for a real estate broker if:
(i) substantially all of the real estate sales agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from real
estate commissions; and
(ii) the services of the real estate sales agent or
associated broker are performed under a written
contract that:
(A) the real estate agent is an independent
contractor; and
(B) the real estate sales agent or associated
broker is not to be treated as an employee for
federal income tax purposes;
(b) an offender performing labor under Section 6413-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or
regulation;
(c) an individual who for an insurance agent or broker,
as defined in Section 31A-1-301, solicits, negotiates,
places or procures insurance if:
(i) substantially all of the individual's income from
those services is from insurance commissions; and
(ii) the services of the individual are performed
under a written contract that states that the individual:
(A) is an independent contractor;
(6) is not to be treated as an employee for
federal income tax purposes; and
(C) can derive income from more than one
insurance company; or
(d) notwithstanding Subsection 34A-2-103(4), an individual who provides domestic work for a person if:
(i) the person for whom the domestic work is being
provided receives or is eligible to receive the domestic
work under a state or federal program designed to
pay the costs of domestic work to prevent the person
from being placed in:
(A) an institution; or
(B) a more restrictive placement than where
that person resides at the time the person receives the domestic work;
(ii) the individual is paid by a person designated by
the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with
Section 3504, Internal Revenue Code, as a fiduciary,
agent, or other person that has the control, receipt,
custody, or disposal of, or pays the wages of the
individual; and
(iii) the domestic work is performed under a written contract that notifies the individual that the
individual is not an employee under this chapter or
Chapter 3.
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(6) An individual described in Subsection (5)(d) may become an employee under this chapter and Chapter 3 if the
employer of the individual complies with:
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3; and
(b) commission rules.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 51; C.L. 1917, § 3111; L. 1919,
ch. 63, § 1; 1925, ch. 73, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-41; L. 1939, ch.
51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-41; L. 1943, ch. 48, § 1; 1945, ch. 65,
§ 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1;
1975, ch. 101, § 2; 1984, ch. 76, § 1; 1985, ch. 75, § 1; 1986,
ch. 211, § 4; 1988, ch. 109, § 2; 1993, ch. 106, § 2; 1993, ch.
130, § 1; 1995, ch. 307, § 2; C. 1953, 35-1-43; renumbered by
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 108; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 86;
1998, ch. 45, § 1; 2001, ch. 171, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective
May 1, 1995, redesignated Subsection (3)(a) as (3), deleting a
requirement to serve notice on the commission, replacing
"150%" with "100%" and "employee" with "partner or sole
proprietor electing coverage" in the last sentence, and making
stylistic changes; redesignated Subsection (3)(b) as (4), deleting a requirement to serve notice on the commission; redesignated Subsection (4) as (5), adding "sales" before "agent"
throughout the subsection; and redesignated Subsection (5) as
(6).
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as § 35-1-43, and, in
Subsection (l)(b), substituted "35A-3-103" for "35-1-42."
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-3-104; inserted references to* "Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act" and "Chapter 3" throughout; deleted "or 'workmen'" and
'or 'workman"' after "worker" in Subsections (1) and (5);
substituted "34A-2-103" for "35A-3-103" in Subsection (l)(b);
redesignated former Subsection (6) as Subsection (5Xb); and
made stylistic changes.
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, divided Subsection (5Xa)(ii), adding the (A) designation; deleted "specifying" after "contract" in Subsection (5XaXii); redesignated
former Subsection (5)(a)(iii) as (5)(a)(ii)(B); deleted "the contract states that" at the beginning of Subsection (5XaXiiXB);
added Subsection (5Xc); and made related changes throughout
Subsection (5).
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsections (5Xd) and (6); subdivided Subsections (lXa), (lXb),
and (2); in Subsections (3) and (4) divided Subsection (b) into
(b) and (c); and made related and numerous stylistic changes.
Federal Law. — The Internal Revenue Code, cited in
Subsection (5Xd), is Title 26 of the U.S. Code.
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